Blitz Bureau
NEW DELHI: Among the many firsts that countries across the world are being forced to do as a result of the petulant policies and high-handed attitude of US President Donald Trump, is Japan setting up its first centralised intelligence agency since World War II. According to an analysis by Al Jazeera, Japan’s move is aimed at modernising its defence capabilities against spies, foreign interference and other attacks from foreign adversaries.
Legislation to establish the new agency was passed by the upper house of Japan’s National Diet in May, a month after it cleared the lower house.
After decades of relying on US intelligence support and after a pacifist stance was enshrined in the Japanese Constitution, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi described this law as “a first step” towards strengthening the country’s espionage capabilities.
Two new entities to be created
The legislation will create two bodies: a National Intelligence Council that will act as the government’s command centre for intelligence gathering and analysis and an agency for operations. The reform changes the existing Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) into a centralised National Intelligence Council and National Intelligence Bureau.
According to Martha van der Wolf, the author of the Al Jazeera article, Takaichi isn’t exactly building the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), but The New York Times reported that Western allies, including the United States, Germany and Australia, are advising the Japanese government on establishing the new spy agency.
Ken Kotani, professor at Nihon University, said he believes Japan’s new National Intelligence Council and national intelligence agency model will be original to Japan.
Sanshiro Hosaka, a research fellow at the Estonia-based International Centre for Defence and Security, said the reform is aimed at improving the Japanese government’s intelligence abilities “by strengthening coordination, reducing interagency barriers and ensuring that intelligence products better meet policymakers’ requirements”.
Why does Japan want it now?
Tokyo says it is facing threats from a number of nearby countries such as North Korea, Russia and China, and a national intelligence agency is needed to counter their efforts.
Kotani explained that Japan’s foreign and national security policy followed the US during the Cold War period. But he noted that “recently Japan has gradually pursued her own policy, especially in the Trump administration period.”
Trump has repeatedly accused Washington’s allies of not spending enough on their own defence and on relying on American help. He has questioned US alliances and has been ambivalent about whether the world’s most powerful military would come to the defence of smaller nations.
That, Kotani said, is why “Japan needs to collect intelligence by herself.”
Japan lacks an anti-espionage law that would make it relatively easy for foreign intelligence activities to go unpunished.
Hosaka explained that former Russian intelligence officers who operated in Japan, such as Stanislav Levchenko and Konstantin Preobrazhensky, described Japan as a paradise for spies: “During the Cold War, Soviet intelligence targeted Japanese technologies, industrial and commercial information as well as the US bases in Japan,” Hosaka explained. “As a major US ally in Asia and an advanced technological economy, Japan remains an important intelligence target for China, Russia, North Korea and others.”
Hosaka said what Japan needs “is a foreign-influence transparency law to increase the transparency of foreign actors’ lobbying activities as well as to deter illegal foreign interference. And an antiespionage law to conduct undercover operations and investigations using assumed identities.”
Why the current system isn’t working
A major obstacle within Japan’s current decentralised structure, experts said, is that no one has the authority to force cooperation from other agencies or bodies or prevent intelligence data from being scattered.
Kotani explained that the political power of Japan’s current intelligence agency has been weak: “This was because the CIRO was not given any legal mandates on intelligence when it was established in 1952.”
Another difficulty is that under current Japanese laws, foreign representatives suspected of potential intelligence affiliations or interference are difficult to intercept because legal grounds are weak for Japanese authorities to intercept their communications or prosecute them.
The ambitions of Takaichi
Takaichi took office in October and has accelerated the expansion of Japan’s military and security ambitions through a number of measures, including establishing a central intelligence body.
In December, the cabinet approved its largest defence budget ever at $58bn as the Ministry of Defence said it needed to accelerate its “transformation” and would use more than $600m for building a so-called drone and laser shield to protect its south-western region.
In April, Takaichi’s cabinet moved closer to abolishing a longstanding ban on the export of lethal weapons, such as tanks and warships.
The new direction led to anti-war protests on the streets of Japan in May. However, a Jiji opinion poll in April showed only 19 per cent were opposed to the new bill to reform intelligence within the country. About 40 per cent were indifferent, and the rest were in favour.
Kotani said he has noticed a lot of the old “taboo has gone” around this subject and it is no longer a topic of concern to many Japanese, He said: “Especially younger generations are not interested in such an old story.”
Why surveillance is controversial in Japan
Japan’s defeat in World War II left its citizens with distrust towards state surveillance as the wartime Special Higher Police, known as the Tokko, monitored, arrested and tortured citizens for their political beliefs.
Article 9 in its constitution, drafted in 1947 shortly after the end of the war, renounced war, and Japan has never had its own foreign intelligence service. Instead, it relied on the US.
The efforts for a new security agency have sparked some domestic criticism, but Hosaka said the latest reforms do not amount to a return to the kind of espionage apparatus that could be used against Japanese civilians.
“The legislation does not itself create significant new intelligence collection or counterintelligence powers,” Hosaka said.

Masters of intelligence
The history of modern intelligence agencies reflects the evolution of global security needs, with many of the world’s most prominent services emerging from the necessity of wartime coordination or the geopolitical shifts of the mid-20th century.
MI6 (UK): Established in 1909 as the “Foreign section of the secret service bureau,” it is one of the oldest modern intelligence agencies and has served as a blueprint for many others. Short form of Military Intelligence Section 6, it led to the birth of one of the famous fictional spy characters James Bond. Its creator, British author Ian Fleming, was himself a key figure in naval intelligence during WWII and had worked closely with MI6.
CIA (USA): Formed in the aftermath of World War II in 1947 to centralise the fragmented intelligence efforts that preceded the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Central Intelligence Agency aims to ensure better coordination for policymakers. Its mechanisations have inspired scores of Hollywood films and television shows over the years.
Mossad (Israel): Known for its high operational precision, it was formed shortly after the state of Israel was founded, in 1949, to provide strategic intelligence and manage existential security threats. The daredevilry of this intelligence agency forms the backdrop of famous television show “Fauda”.
R&AW (India): The Research & Analysis Wing was created in India in 1968 following the 1962 Sino-Indian War and 1965 India-Pakistan War. The agency’s aim was to develop dedicated foreign intelligence capability, separating it from the domestic-focused Intelligence Bureau (IB). The agency’s prowess and exploits have fired the imagination of numerous writers of films and web shows.
FSB (Russia): The roots of Federal Security Service trace back to the Soviet-era KGB. It was formally established in its modern structure in 1995 to oversee domestic security, counter-terrorism, and cyber-security.
Trump has repeatedly accused Washington’s allies of not spending enough on their own defence and on relying on American help. He has questioned US alliances and has been ambivalent about whether the world’s most powerful military would come to the defence of smaller nations.
Welcome to arms race
The shift in Japan’s intelligence posture is part of a broader, historic transition in global geopolitics. As the United States adopts a more conditional and transactional approach to its security guarantees under President Donald Trump, allies across both Europe and the Indo-Pacific are realising that they can no longer rely on the “unconditional American umbrella.”
This transition — often described as a move toward “strategic autonomy” or “military self-reliance” — is forcing nations to restructure their defence, industrial, and diplomatic policies.
European NATO allies and Canada have experienced a massive surge in defence investment. For the first time, all NATO members have met the baseline target of spending 2 per cent of their GDP on defence. By 2035, they are committed to increasing it to 5 per cent of their GDP, with 3.5 per cent dedicated to core military requirements and 1.5 per cent allocated to broader security, infrastructure, and cyber resilience.
Countries such as South Korea and Australia are aggressively stockpiling ammunition and building their own domestic production lines. Australia, for example, is heavily focusing on domestic guided weapons and explosive ordnance manufacturing to ensure it can fight through potential supply chain disruptions.
Rather than relying solely on grand, US-led treaties, nations are building smaller, highly focused security webs with one another to manage regional crises. Middle powers are deepening ties directly. Japan, Australia, and South Korea are integrating their defence postures, holding joint military exercises, and sharing technology without always routing these initiatives through Washington.
Nations are independently investing in “hardening” their infrastructure against cyberattacks and physical strikes, dispersing military assets so they aren’t concentrated in easy-to-target bases, and training local forces to present a highly resilient, difficult-to-conquer target to potential aggressors.
The retreat of the US “security bounty” has also extended into the economic sphere. Nations are securing their own critical supply chains to avoid being caught in the crossfire of US trade policies or sudden export restrictions.
Governments are bypassing traditional US-brokered trade routes to secure direct bilateral agreements for critical minerals, semiconductor manufacturing components, and green energy technologies.













