Pakistan’s decision to raise the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit highlights a widening divide between Islamabad’s diplomatic narrative and New Delhi’s security-first approach to bilateral ties. Pak Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s warning that water must never be used as a political weapon was an attempt to shift the debate towards international law, treaty obligations and regional cooperation. He stressed that agreements must be implemented in both their “spirit and wording”, portraying Pakistan as a defender of rulesbased cooperation.
Contrasting messages
India, however, sees the Indus treaty through a different lens. New Delhi placed the 1960 agreement in abeyance after the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, which killed 26 people, making clear that cooperation cannot be insulated from crossborder terrorism. The move was part of a zero-tolerance policy under which terrorism is no longer treated as a separate issue from the overall bilateral relationship.
This explains the contrasting messages delivered at the SCO summit. PM Modi called on member states to confront the entire terrorist ecosystem, including financing, recruitment, radicalisation and safe havens. Sharif, meanwhile, focused on water, diplomacy and international agreements.
The two positions reflect competing attempts to define the issue in IndiaPakistan relations. The Hague-based Court of Arbitration’s ruling that the IWT remains legally binding has given Pakistan a diplomatic argument. But it has not altered India’s position. New Delhi has rejected the tribunal as illegally constituted, saying it never accepted its jurisdiction or participated in its proceedings. India has also maintained that the tribunal cannot pronounce on its sovereign decisions or influence its actions concerning hydroelectric projects.
Internationalising dispute
This creates a diplomatic impasse. Pakistan can continue presenting the treaty as an international legal obligation, while India insists that the circumstances surrounding terrorism have changed the basis for bilateral cooperation. The dispute is, therefore, moving beyond individual water projects towards a contest over sovereignty, security and the limits of international mechanisms.
Pakistan can continue presenting the treaty as an international legal obligation, while India insists that the circumstances surrounding terrorism have changed the basis for bilateral cooperation
For Pakistan, taking the issue to the SCO serves another purpose: internationalising a dispute in which bilateral channels have narrowed. By describing water as essential to future generations and linking it to regional peace, Islamabad can seek sympathy among Central Asian states that themselves face water-security challenges.
For India, the challenge is to ensure that its position is understood not as opposition to water cooperation but as a consequence of its terrorism policy. New Delhi’s argument is essentially that a treaty cannot be treated as an isolated arrangement when the broader relationship has been destabilised by cross-border terrorism.
The Indus dispute is becoming a test of whether India and Pakistan can compartmentalise their differences, or whether terrorism will reshape every remaining pillar of bilateral engagement. At Bishkek, the contrasting narratives suggest the latter.
